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There exists an extensive literature about economies with price rigidities, where some
constraints on the set of admissible prices are exogenously given. In this paper a general
equilibrium model extended by a political system is described where the price rigidities
are endogenously chosen by political candidates. Sufficient conditions for the existence
of a mixed strategy and a pure strategy equilibrium are given. Finally an example is
discussed, where in equilibrium both political candidates propose price rigidities excluding
the Walrasian equilibrium price system. Journal oj Economíc Liternture Classifacation
Numbers: C62, C7,2, D51, D7~1.1
1 Introduction
Often guvc~rnmcnL behaviour is considered to be exogenous in econornic modelling. Ilow-
c,vc~r, Lh~~n~ r~xisl.s nu n~ason why government, bchaviour should nol. hc~ explainecí, whilc
behaviour of other agents acting in the economy is endogenously determined. 'I'he influ-
ence of the government on for example minimum wages is substantial and the existence of
minimum wages clearly influences economic behaviour of producers and consumers. More-
over the producers and consumers influence the level of the minimum wages by voting or
by forrning pressurc groups. For cxamplc high Icvcls of uncmploymcnt rnight increa.4c thc
pressure on government to lower minimum wages. Hence in order to explain the existence
of minimum wages and to give an analysis of the most important determinants of the level
of miuirnum wages, governmeut behaviour should be rnodelled endogenously. The exis-
tence of minimum wages is just one example of a price rigidity. Other examples are price.
controls to reduce inflation (see Cox (1980)), minimum prices for agricultural products,
fixed exchange rates, price indexation, and the linkage between the wages of civil servants
and the wages paid in industry. The existence of price regulations and price rigidities is
a frequently occurring real world phenomenon. Nguyen and Whalley (1990, p. 667) make
the same observation, stating: "Price controls have been employed by governments all over
the world, during war and peace, in response to all manners of threats (both real and
imaginary), and in all ages" and Levy (1991, p. 157) writes: "Price controls are pervasive
in developing countries."
An iarportant reason for the existence of price regulations is that they can be used to
influence the redistribution of initial endowments. As Coughlin (1986) argues, redistribu-
tion has become one of the most important political issues of the last three decades. A
drawback of price regulations is the misallocation of resources resulting in efficiency losses.
In this paper a formal model capturing the ideas above is given. A stylized model
of the political system corresponding with a democracy is described. The government
consists of two political parties or candidates who compete for the votes of the consumers
in the economy. For the sake of simplicity it is assumed that there are no producers in
the. economy. The candidates have the possibility to propose price regulations in order to
influence the redistribution of initial endowments of the consumers.
The private sector will be modelled by a general equilibrium model. However, in case
a candidate proposes some regulation of the prices all the competitive equilibrium price
systems might be excluded by the impoaed price rigidities. Hence an equi]ibrium in the
classical sense cannot always be achieved. In order to obtain an equilibrium situation
rationing may occur. The inclusion of price rigidities and rationing into general equilibrium
models has been introduced by Benassy (1975), Drèze (1975), and Younès (1975). In this
paper the equilibrium concept of Drèze will be used in case price regulations are proposed.2
[n most of the existing literature about models with price rigidities some constraints
on the set of admissible prices are exogenously given. Some exceptions worth mentioning
are Hart (1982), BShm, Maskin, Polemarchakis, and Postlewaite (1983), Madden (1983),
and Silvesire (1988). In these papers (some of the) agents in the economy are price sett.ers
on som~, of Lhe markct,s. Li I,his way prices are endogenously determined and may be non-
Walr.ueian .rnd Lhc~r~dorr~ possibly involve nncrnployrncnt. llowcvcr, it sc~cros Lo hc diflicull.
to Pxtend the results of t.hesP papers to genPral caxes with more tha.n t.hree commodities.
In the model presented in this paper political candidates may impose price regulations
on the markets. Both government behaviour and price rigidities are endogenously deter-
mined. The control of prices by government is also the subject of Nguyen and Whalley
(1986) and Ginsburgh and van der Heyden (1988). In these papers government behaviour
and price rigidities are not endogenously determined, but the attention is focused on non-
rationing mechanisms to solve the mismatch between supply and demand resulting from
price regulations. This mismatch is solved by endogenously determined equilibrium buying
and selling prices in Nguyen and Whalley (1986) and by government sales and purchases
in Ginsburgh and van der Heyden (1988).
Exchange economies with price rigidities will be treated in Section 2. The voting be-
haviour of consumers and the public sector are described in Section 3. In Section 4 sufficient
conditions for the existence of a mixed strategy and a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for
the game defined in Section 3 are given. In order to prove existence it is shown that for
every economy there exists an upper bound, being chosen independently of the price regu-
lations imposed, such that if the price on a market is above this upper bound then in every
possible constrained equilibrium no trade takes place on this market. This result is quite
intuitive and has some interest in itself. In Section 5 an example with two commodities and
Cobb-Douglas utility functions is presented in which both political candidates impose price
regulations excluding the Walrasian equilibrium price system, and therefore the resulting
equilibrium is characterized by rationing.
2 Economies with Price Rigidities
In order to allow political candidates to have the possibility to propose price regulations,
a model dealing with price regulations in an exchange economy is given in this section.
Moreover, some important properties of this model are provided. An exchange economy
with price regulations is denoted by Ely,pl -({X', ~', w'}m1, Plp,pl). In this economy there
are m consumers indexed i- 1, ..., m, and n-~ 1 commodities indexed j- 0, ..., n.
Consumer i, i- 1, ..., m, is defined by a consumption set X', a preference relation r'
on X', and a vector of initial endowments w`. The vector of total initial endowments will3
be denoted by vi, so w- ~m1 w'. The set of admissible prices is denoted by PlP,pl. An
exchange economy ({X',}',w'};"~) without a priori specified price regulations will be
denoted by ,J'. In the following, for k E N, I~ denotes the set of integers {1, ..., k} and
~ denotes the set of integers {0, 1,... , k}. The following assumptions will be made with
respect to an exchange economy with price regulations E~p,pl.
A1. '['he consumption set X' C R~tl is convex, closed, and X' -F Rtt' C X', for every
t E :,n.
A2. The initial endowments w' are an element of the interior of X', for every i E Im.
A3. The preference relation ~' on X' is complete, transitive, continuous, strongly mono-
tonic, and convex, for every i E Im.
A4. The set of admissible prices is equal to PlP,yl -{p E Rt}' Ipo - 1, p~ G p~ G p~, yj E I„},
for some given p E Rt and p E Rt with p~ G p~, for every j E I,,. -
If for a consurner i E l,,,, not x' r' y' for two commodity bundles x',y` E X', then this
will be denoted by y` ~` x`, and in case both x' ~' y' and y' ~' x' we denote this by
y' ~' x'. '1'he convexity assumption in A3 means that if x', y' E X` and if x' ~' y`, then
ax' -F (1 - a) y' ~` y', 'da E(0, 1). The strong monotonicity assumption implies that if
x',y' E X', x~ G y}, t~j E Io, and ~j' E In such that x'~, G y~,, then y` ~' x'. As has been
shown in Debreu (1959) Assumptions A1 and A2 imply that it is possible to represent the
preferences of consumer i E Im by a continuous utility function u' from X' into [0, 1). In
the following it is assumed that some particular representation u` is chosen.
The price set P~P,yI in the model allows for a minimum price, p~, and for a maximum
price, p„ for commodity j E I,,. Commodity 0 is a numeraire commodity with price equal
to 1. For commodity j E I„ there may be total inflexibility of the price, i.e., p~ - p„ or a
more moderate form of price rigidity, p~ G p~. Formally, on the marke.t of each commodity
some minimunt and some maximum price is specified. However, in Theorem 2.4 it is shown
that if the minimum price of a commodity is taken small enough or the maximum price
large enough, this is equivalent to specifying no minimum price or no maximum price,
respectively. Define the set R by
R-{x E R~ ~ b'j E],,, x~ G x~~„}.
Then P~p,pl is a set of admissible prices satisfying Assumption A4 if and only if (p,p) E R.
In the economy E~p,pl a price system p E P~P,pI at which for each commodity total supply
is equal to its total demand does not necessarily exist. This is the case if no Walrasian
equilibrium price system is an element of P~p,pl. Then the price mechanism is not capable
of equating demand and supply on all markets.a
Rciut;hly tipuken, whi~n thrn, is excess dcrnand on oni~ of Lhc marki,l, and it, is nul. pussi
ble to raise the price of this commodity, the market will be cleared by quantity adjust.rnents.
Not all t}~e demand can be satisfied, so the excess demand of some consumers has to be
restricted in such a way that demand equals supply. When there is an excess demand on a
market and it is possible to raise the price, an upward price adjustmenL will result. In such
a case a yuantity adjustment is not desired. When there is an excess supply on a market
and it is not possible to lower the price of this commodity, the market can also be cleared
by quantity adjustments. Again the excess supply of some consumers has to be restricted
in such a way that dernand equals supply. If there is an excess supply on a market and it is
possible to lower the price, then a quantity adjustment is not desired, because a downward
price adjustment could be made in an attempt to increase the demand. These quantity
adjustments will be called rationing in the following. Rationing should not affect excess
supply and excess demand simultaneously to guarantee that markets are frictionless, and
rationing should not force any consumer to exchange. Moreover, on the market of the
numeraire commodity no rationing is allowed. These properties give the motivation for
the equilibrium concept of Drèze (1975) for an exchange econorny with price regulations.
Before giving this equilibrium concept some additional notation will be introduced. It has
to be rernarked that alternative equilibrium concepts for exchange economies with price
rigidities have been provided by Benassy (1975) and Younès (1975). In Silvestre (1982)
conditions are given under which the approaches of Benassy, Drèze, and Younès are equiv-
alent. Moreover it is shown that if no differentiability assumptions are made with respect
to utility functions then Drèze's definition is the strictest one. This result and the mathe-
matical convenience of Drèze's definition motivate the use of Drèze's equilibrium concept
in this paper.
For the sake of simplicity it is assumed that there is uniform rationing, which means
that the same upper bound on excess demand and on excess supply is specified for each
consumer. Hence the rationing scheme of every consumer is given by a pair of vectors
(!,L) E-Rt x R}. The maximal net amount a consumer may supply of commodity
j E I„ is given by -l~ and the maximal net amount a consumer may demand of commodity
j E I„ is given by L~. The constrained budget set of consumer i E Im at rationing scheme
(l, L) E -R~ x R~ and price system p E Rt}1 is equal to the set
~'~ (1, L,P) -{x' E X` Idj E h,, h G x'~ - w~ G L„ P'x' G p. w' }.
The constrained budget set oí consumer i E Im is non-empty for all admissible 1, L,
and p, because w` E ry' (l, L, p) . The demand of consumer i E I,,, at rationing scheme
(1, L) E -R~ x Rt and price system p E Rtt' is denoted by 6' (1, L, p) and is given by
ó' (1, L,P) - 1 x` E 7' (l,L,P) u'(x') - max u`(y`)
1. ll y'E7'í~,L.P)5
Notice that the constrained budget set and the demand of consumer i E I,,, also has been
defined for price systems p with po ~ 1. This will be convenient in some of the subsequent
proofs. Ifpo 1 0 then the budget set ry'(1, L, p) is compact using the definition and therefore
á'(1, L, p) is non-empty valued if po 1 0, even if some of the other prices p„ j E I,,, equal
zero. Sometimes it will be useful in proofs to consider the following constrained budget
set. Let an economy E be given. Then for every consumer i E Im the correspondence
I'' :-R; x R; x R{}r -~ R}}' is defined by
r` (l, G,P) -{ ~' E 7`(l, G, P) ~ xó - wo G wo} , d(l, L,P) E -Rt x Rt x R}fr.
'Phe corresponding constrained demand correspondence of consumer i E Im, 0' :-R~ x
Rt x R~t' -r Rt}r has the advantage of being non-empty valued for every (l, L, p) E
-Rt x Rt x Rttr.
Given ( l, G, p) E -R} x R~ x R~tr consumer i E Im is said to be constrained on his
supply on market k E I,,, or equivalently Ik is said to be binding for consumer i E I,,,, if
~' E ó'(l, I,, p) and x' E ó'(l, I,, p) implies s` ~` x', where 1 is the rationing scheme with
f; -!;, Vj E I„ `{k} arld 1~; -!k - E for somc arbitrary positivc rcal nurnbcr e. llsing thc
corrvexity of preferences it is not difficult to show that if consurner i E l,,, is constrained
on market k then x' E ó`(l, L, p) implies !k - xk - wk, and if consumer i E Im is not
constrained orr market k then a' E ó'(l, L, p) implies x' E ó'(l, L, p). Similar remarks can
be made with respect to demand rationing. The remarks given above are also true for the
correspondence 0`.
Let be given an economy E. For every real number M a set of rationing schemes and
prices, G~y, is defined by
G,y - {(l,L,p)E-R}xR~x{1}xR}~VjEI,,,h~-w~andL~Cw„
3k E!„ such that pk 1 M and l~ - - wk, and
if h G 0 for some j E I„ then there is a k E I„ such that pk 1 p~ and lk - -ruk}.
If (l, L, p) E .CM then there is at least one commodity k E I„ with price greater than
or equal to M and with !k - -wk which guarantees that no consumer is constrained orr
his supply on rnarket k. Moreover, if it is possible to supply a positive arnount of some
commodity j E l,,, i.e., 1~ G 0, then there exists a commodity k E I„ with price at least
as lrigh as p~ and witb lk - -wk. Finally, the rationing schemes in G,y are bounded, for
every commodity j E I„ it holds that -w~ C l~ G 0 and 0 G L~ C w~. It should be noticed
that Mr 1 M2 implies ,C,y, C G,y~. The following lemma states that if M is large enough
then for every consumer i E Im the demand of commodity 0 according to 0' at prices
and rationing schemes in the set ,C~y exceeds the total initial endowment of commodity 0.
Lemma 2.1 is closely related to theorems providing boundary conditions on demand func-
tions without taking into account the possibility of rationing, see for example Proposition6
3.1.4 of Hildenbrand and Kirman (1988). Lemma 2.1 can therefore be considered as an
extension of those theorems to the case where rationing is allowed. Lemma 2.1 will play
an important role in the proofs of Theorem 2.9, Theorem 4.2, and Lemma 4.3.
Lemma 2.1
Let an econoray E satisfying Assumptions A1, A~, and A3 be given. Then there exists an
M E R such that if (l, L, p) E G~y then for every i E I,n, a' E 0`(1, L, p) implies x~ 1 wn.
Proof
Suppose Lemma 2.1 is false. Then there exists a consumer i E Im and a sequence
(1', I', pr x'~ )rEN in the set Gr x X' such that a'r E ~'(Ir, Lr,pr) and xó G t7wo. Con




which without loss of generality can be assumed to converge to an element (l, L, 0, p, x') E
-Rt x Rt x{0} x R~ x X'. Notice that since a'` E I''(lr,Lr, pr) and (1r, Lr, pr) E G, x'{
remains in a bounded set. Moreover, (1r, Lr, p') E Gr implies that ~~p'~~ -~ oo rf r -~ oo.
By the homogeneity of degree zero in prices of the demand correspondence it holds that
for every r E N, x'r E 0'(Ir,Lr,
II~)'
Suppose p' 1 ~ 0, then by the lemma in Drèze (1975, p. 304) it holds that 0' is upper
semi-continuous at (1, L, 0, p) and therefore x' E 0'(l, L, 0, p). By the strict monotonicity
of preferences it holds that zó - wó - wo. This contradicts xó G wo, Hr E N. Consequently
p.1-0. -
Suppose there exists a subsequence (1r', Lr', Il~,x''.),Ex of the sequence in (1) such that
for some k E In with p~ ~ 0, for every s E N, !k is not binding for consumer i. Then
x'r~ E 0'(1'', Lr', p''), where 1'' is the rationing scheme with 1~' - h', `dj E In `{k}, and
!k' --vik. f3y considering the sequence (1'', L'', II~, x''e ),EN one obtains a contradiction
in the same way as in the previous paragraph. Consequently, p. 1- 0 and without loss of
generality for every r E N, for every k E In with pk ~ 0, !k -~~ - wk.
Suppose there exists a subsequence (1r', Lr', Ih~I,a'r~),EN
of the sequence in (1) such that
for some k E I„ with pk ~ 0, for every s E N, lk G 0. Since (lr',Lr',p'') E G it r'i
holds for some k'' E In that pk;, ~ pk and lk;. --wkr~. This contradicts p- 1- 0.
Consequently, p. 1- 0 and without loss of generality for every r E N, for every k E In
with pk 1 0, 0-!k - xk - wk.
Define the set J-{k E In ~ pk 1 O}, a non-empty proper subset of 1,,. Without loss of
generality J- I ` I;, for some n E N satisfying 1 G n G n. Now consider a consumer
with characteristics X', ~~, zu', where X`-{x' E Rt}1 ~(.z', wnti, .. ., w;,) E X'}, r~ -
{(x',y') E X' x X` ~(~',w'- w') ~' (y' w`- w')}, w` -(w' w'-). It is n}l~"'~ n i n.}l~"'~ n 0~"'i n7
easily verified that (X',~~,ti') satisfies Assumptions A1, A2, and A3. Moreover, using
that for every k E J, xk - wk, it is clear that the corresponding demand correspondence
~' satisfies ~'r E 0`(l', L', p'), dr E N. Here 1' and L' denote the first n components
of 1' and G', respectively, and p' and ï'~ denote the first n-~ 1 components of p' and
x'~, respectively. Since for every j E I„ ` I;,, 1~ - 0, the definition of Gr implies that
there is no loss of generality in assuming that for every r E N there exists k' E I;,
such that pk, 1 r and !k, --wk.. Consider the bounded sequence (1',L', Ilv'll'x~r),EN in
-R~ x Rt x R~}' x X'. Without loss of generality this sequence converges to an element
(l, L, 0, p, i') E-R~ x R~ x{0} x R~ x,Y'.
Suppose p. l~ 0, then again by Drèze (1975) 0' is upper semi-continuous at (l, G, p) and
the.refore i' E 0`(l, I,, p), yielding a contradiction in the same way a.g before. Repeating
the arguments used before, the finiteness of n and the definition of G. guarantee that in a
finite number of steps the case where p.1 1 0 will be reached, contradicting that for every
r E N, i~ C wo.
Q.E.D.
A constrained equilibrium of an economy ïIP,P) is defined as follows (see Drèze (1975)).
Definition 2.2 (Constrained Equilibrium)
A constrained equilibrium of an economy EIP,y) -({X', } ', w'};"1, PIP,p)) is an element
(x'', . , x'm, l', L', p') of the set jjm1 X' x-R~ x R~ x P~P,p) such that
1. b'2 E ~,n : x" E á' (1', L', P~) i
2. ~;" ~ x"
- w;
3. t1j E!„ : x~~ - w~ - L~ for some h E I,,, implies x~' - w~ ~!~ Hi E 1,,,, and
x~h - w~ - l~ for some h E Im implies x~` - w~ C L~ bi E Im;
4. b'j E In : p~ G p~ implies L~ 1 x~'-w~ `di E Im, and p~ 7 P. implies l~ G x~' -w~ EIi E ~
1,,, .
In Drère (1975) the existence of a constrained equilibrium is shown for any economy i~P,y)
satisfying Assumptions A1, A2, A3, and A4. Let (x'',...,x'"`,p') be a Walrasian equilib-
rium with p~ - I of an economy E-({X',}',w'}m~). Then it is clear that the element
(x'', ..., x'm, -u~, w, p') is a constrained equilibrium of the economy lïllP;,-..,P~),lPj,-.,P~)).
Hence the concept of a constrained equilibrium generalizes the concept of a Walrasian
equilibrium. The choice of the rationing schemes 1' --w and L' - w guarantees that
Conditions 3 and 4 of Definition 2.2 are satisfied. As Lemma 2.3 shows the choice of theseS
rationing schemes is not uniquely determined.
Lemma 2.3
Let an economy i~p,p~ satisjying the Assumptions A1, A2, A9, and A4 be given. I,et
(x'~, ., a'm, !', 1,', p') be a constrained equilibrium oJ lï~p,p~. !f jor a ratíoning sc)aemc
(1, L) E-H} x Rt, jor every j E l,,,
h- x~' - va~ jar some. consumer i E 1,,, implies li - h,
l~ G x~` - w~ jor every consumer i E I,,, implies li G x~' - w~, t1i E I,,,,
L~ - x~' - w~ jor some consumer i E Im implies Li - L~, and
h~ 1 x~' - w~ for every consumer i E I,,, implies Li ~ x~' - w~, `di E I,,,,
then (x'', ... , x'm, l, L, p') is a constrained equilibrium ojE~P,pI.
Proof -
Clearly (x'', ... , x'm, l, L, p') is an element of the set jjm~ X' x-R~ x R~ x P~p,pl. lt
is easily seen that Conditions 2, 3, and 4 of a constrained equilibrium are satisfied by
(x'r, x'm l, L, p') , using the properties of 1 and L and the fact that (x'I x'm, l`, L', p`)
is a constrained equilibrium. So it remains to be shown that Condition 1 of a con-
strained equilibrium is satisfied. Suppose for some i E Im, x" ~ b` (1, L, p') . Clearly
x" E ry' (l, L, p`) . Hence for some y' E y' (l, L, p') , y' ~' x". Since y' ~ ry' (l', L', p')
and y' E y' (l,L,p') it has to hold that for some j E I,,, !i G y~ - w'~ C l~, or for some
j E l,,, I,~ G y~ - w~ C Li. Moreover, it holds that
Iy'.-w',G!'~!`Gx"-w'.]and(y'-w'.~L'~L'~x"-w'.] (2) ~ ~ i ~ i ~ i ~ ~ i ~ ~'
Define `da E(0, 1) , y' (a) - ay' f(1 - a) x". By the convexity oí ry'(l, L, p') it holds
that y' (a) E y' (l, I,, p") , Va E(0,1) . By the convexity of r', y' (a) ~' a", b~a E(0, l).
However, if a is close enough to zero then y' (~) E ry' (l', L', p") , using (2) and the fact that
y' (a) E ry' (l, L, p') . This is a contradiction since x" E b' (1', L', p') . Hence Condition 1 of
a constrained equilibrium is satisfied by (x'r, . . ., x`m, l, L, p') .
Q.E.ll.
For every commodity both a lower and an upper bound were specified in the model de-
scribed above. The following theorem makes clear that it is possible to use this model
also in case on a market only a minimum price or a maximum price is given, or even in
case there are no constraints on the prices at all, corresponding to the Walrasian ca.se. Let
J C I„ denote the possibly empty set of commodities on the market for which a minimum
price is present, and let J C I„ denote the possibly empty set of commodities on the market
for which a maximum price prevails. Again, for j E J, pi denotes the minimum price on9
the market of commodity j and for j E J, p~ denotes the maximum price on the market of
commodity j. Now it is possible to make the following assumption, which is weaker than
Assumption A4.
A4'. 'I'he sct of adrnissible prices is equal to
hI~O~)iEI~IPi),E3) - lP E R}}1 IPo - I, d1 E,L, p~ C Pi, dJ E J, Pi C Pi },
with Vj E,L, p~ E Rt, tlj E J, p~ E Rt, and b'j E l.fl J, p~ C p~.
A constrained equilibrium of an economy ïllP )~E,,~p~),EJ) -({X', ~', w'}m„P~~p,) E~,(y~),EJ))
is defined according to Definition 2.2, where if j~ J then L~ ~ x~` - w~, tJi E I,,,, and if
j~ J then (~ G a~' - w~, Vi E I,,,. Hence demand rationing is never allowed to be binding
if no maximum price is specified and supply rationing is not binding if no minimum price
is present. In case J- J - 0 one obtains the definition of a Walrasian equilibrium, since
non-binding rationing schemes are irrelevant. The following theorem shows that there is
no loss of generality in making Assumption A4, or equivalently describing price regulations
by an element (p,p) E R, instead of making Assumption A4'.
Theorem 2.4
Let an economy ïlly~)~E,,Ip,) E~) - ({X', ~`, w`};"1, P~~p~)~E,,~p~) El)) satisfying Assumptions
A1, A2, A3, and A4' be given. Then there exists (~', p') E R such that (x'1, , x'"` l', L', p')
is a constrained equilibrium ojL~~p~)~E~~IP~)~E)) if and only iJ(x'1, .., x~`,1', L', p') is a con-
strained equilibrium ojthe economy E1n,,~~) - ({X',~',w`};-r,Plp,,p,)).
Proof
Let M be as in Lemma 2.1 for the economy E-({X', ~',w'}mt) and take N E R such
thatlVlMandNlp., VjEJ.ForjEJletp'.-p.,forjEl„`Jletp'.-0,forjEJ
- -~ -~ -~ -~
let p'~ - p„ and for j E 1„ `J let p~ - N. This defines the economy Elp,,p,).
Suppose (x'r, ... , x'm,!', L', p') is a constrained equilibrium of the economy E~~p~)~E,,~y~)~E~)
satisfying ~~P'~~~ ~ N. Using the same arguments as in Lemma 2.3 and the fact that
~;"1 x" - w, there is no loss of generality in assuming that l~ --wJ if j E 1„ satisfies
l~ G x~' - w~, b'i E Im, and that L~ - w~ if j E I„ satisfies L~ ~ x~' - w~, di E I,,,.
Since (x'1, . .. , x`m, !', L', p') is a constrained equilibrium of the economy Et~p~)~E,,~y~),E~)
it then holds that h ~-w~ and L~ C w„ `dj E 1,,. For all h E l,,,, x'ti E áti(l', L', p'),
and since xóh - wó C~;"1 xó' - wo, x'n E Oh(I', L', p'). If j E I„ is such that pj ~ N
then N~ p~, Hj E J, implies h- -w~. So (1`, L', p') E Giy and consequently xo' 1 wo
for every i E l,,,, contradicting Condition 2 of Definition 2.2. So p' E P~y~,p~~ and therefore
(x'1, , x'm l', L', p') is a constrained equilibrium of ~ly~,~~).
Let a constrained equilibrium (xr1, ..., x'm, l', L', p') of ElD-,y~l be given. Using Lemma 2.3
and the fact that ~;"r x" - w there is no loss of generality in assuming that l~ --w~ if10
j E~„ satisfies h G x~'-w~, `dz E Im, and that L~ - wi ifj E I„ satisfies G~ ~ x~'-w~, b'i E
Im. Since (x'', ..., x'm, l', L', p') is a constrained equilibrium of the economy E~p~,p~~ it then
holds that 1~ 1-ti~~ and I,~ G wi, b'j E 1,,. Suppose (x'~, ., x'"`, l', 1,', p') is not a con-
straincd oquilibriurn of E~~n,~,E,,~y,l,E~~. 'f'hcn for somc j E 1„`J, p~ - 0 and h-:r.~' - v~i
for somc i E 1,,,, or fur somc J E ~„`J, P~ - N and G~ - x~' - w~ for somc i E 1,,,. Considcr
the first case. lf p~ - 0 then by the strict monotonicity of the preference relation it holda
that x~' - u,~ - L~ ~ h- x~` - w~, where for the inequality Condition 3 of Definition 2.2 is
used. This is a contradiction. Consider the second case. By Condition 4 of a constrained
equilibrium for every j E 1„ for which p~ - N it holds that 1~ --wi, so (l', L", p") E Giy.
Clearly for every i E I,,,, x"` E ~`(l', L',p') and consequently x~ 1 wo, contradicting
Condition 2 of Definition `2.2.
Q.E.D.
Let be given an economy Elp,yl - ({X',~',w'};"r,Ply,yl). In Theorem 2.5 it is shown that
it is possible to represent the admissible prices and rationing schemes by the set
Q-{qER"~OGqjGl, djEln},
of which an element q will be called a pseudo-price vector. For every j E I,,, the j-th
component of the functions p: R x Q--~ {1} x R~, 1: Q--i -Rt, and L: Q-. R} ís
defined by
pi(p,1~,q) - rnax{pi,min{pi,pi(2 - 3qi) -f pi(3qi - 1)}}, d(p,p) E R, dq E Q,
li (q} - - min { 1, 3qi } wi, tlq E Q,
Li(q)-min{1,3-3qi}wi, b~qEQ.
Note that po(p, p, q) - 1, H(p, p) E R, Vq E Q. In this way a pseudo-price q E Q determines
an admissible price p(p, p, q) and a rationing scheme (l (q) , L(q)). R,emark that for every
7EIn,
0 C qi G 3 implies Pi(P,P,4) - Pi, li (4) ~-iwi, and Li (q! - wi,
3 C 9i C 3 implies ~i C Pi(P,P,9) C Pi, li (4) --wi, and Li (4) - TLi,
3 G 9i G 1 implies pi(P,P,9) - Pi, li (4) --wi, and Li (q) G wi.
These properties will guarantee that in an equilibrium Conditions 3 and 4 of Definition 2.2
are satisfied if prices and rationing schemes are described using the pseudo-prices. In the
following it is shown that describing prices and rationing schemes by pseudo-prices does
not exclude any of the constrained equilibrium alloca.tiona and prices.11
Theorem 2.5
Let an economy i~p,~l satisfying Assumptions A1, A2, A3, and A4, and a constrained
equilibrium (x'~, ..-, x'm, !', L', p`) of EID,pI 6e given. Then táere exists a pseudo-price
q' E Q such that (x`~, ... , x'm, l(q'), L(q'), p(~, p, q")) is a constrained equilibrium of ïlp,ol,





{j E I„ ~ 3i E I,,, : h- x~' - wj} .
13y Condil.ion 3 of Dcfinition 2.2, `dj E J~, h G x~' -w~, Hi E I,,,, and `dj E J3, x~' -w~ G
1,~, `di E 1,,,. Ny Condition 4 of Dcfinition '1.2, Vj E J~, P~ - pi, and Vj E J`i, P~ - 1~~.
Obviously {J~,Jz,J3} is a partition of I,,. By Assumptions A1 and A2, for every j E
I,,, x~' - w~ ? -w~ 7-w„ `di E Im, and using Assumptions A1 and A2 again, for every
j E In, x~` - w~ G~m1 x~' - w„ `di E Im. Define ! E-Rt by !i --wi, `dj E J' U Jz,
and l~ - 1~, b'j E J'. Define L E R~ by L~ - w„ b'j E Jz U J3, and L~ - L~, Vj E J'.
Then by Lemma 2.3 it holds that (x'', ..., x'm, l, L, p') is a constrained equilibrium for the
economy l;~y,yl. Moreover, l~ ~-w„ and L~ C w„ tlj E I,,. Let q' E Q be defined by
9~ - 1-3',t1JEJ',
~
q' - 1, dj E Jz such that ~~ - p~, i 2
p~ } p~ - 2pi z q~ - ,VjEJ suchthat p~Gp„
3(p~ - p~)
q~ -- 3~w , b~j E J3.
~
It is easily checked that 1(q') - l, L(q') - L, p~p, p, q`~ - p', and therefore
(x'1, ..., x`m, l(q'), L(q'), p(~, p, q')) is a constrained equilibrium of ïlp,pl.
Q.E.D.
3 Endogenously Determined Price Rigidities
The behaviour of the government will be modelled as being the result of the competition
for votes between two political candidates, indexed by k- 1,2. It is not difl'icult to extend
the model in a similar way as in Wittman (1984) and allow for an arbitrary number of12
political candidates. T'he electorate consists of the consumers in the economy and chooses
betwcen the candidatcs by a majority vote.
Candidates are assumed to have the possibility to propose price regulations on the
markets. l~or k E 12i Ak C R denotes the set of admissible price regulations among which
candidate k can choose. An element ak in the set Ak of the candidates corresponds with the
choice of a lower bound and an upper bound on the set of admissible prices. If candidate
k E I2 chooses a policy position ak E Ak then the proposed set Pak of admissible prices of
the economy is given by
Pak -{p E Rttr IPo - 1, d7 E In, a~ G Pi C aitn ~
and thc rcwulting ecconorny is given by ira. -~{X`,r',tv'}~-~ ,Pk) . [n general more than
one constrained equilibrium alloc:ation and príce rnight result for the economy, given auy
lower bound and any upper bound on the prices. For instance the results of Debreu (1979 )
imply that economies exist with an arbitrary number of Walrasian equilibria. It will be
assumed that a candidate proposes besides the chosen price regulation also a corresponding
equilibrium price, amount of supply rationing (also called unemployment), and amount
of demand rationing on each market. By Theorem 2.5 there is no loss of generality in
describing prices and rationing schemes by the pseudo-price q E Q. The set Ck will denote
the set of admissible actions of candidate k E I~ and is therefore given by
Ck -{(ak, q) E Ak x Q ~ there exists a constrained equilibrium
(x', ..., xm, l(q}, I(9),P(ak, 9)) of ïak}.
When Ak - R then the corresponding set of admissible actions Ck is denoted by C. For
(a,q) E C define the indirect utility function v' : C-~ [0,1) of consumer i E Im by
v~(a,4) - u'(x„), for x" E á'(~(9),L(4),P(a,9)).
Obviously, this function is well defined.
In order to describe the assumptions with respect to the set of admissible price regu-
lations of the candidates, a new mathematical concept will be introduced first. llefine for
v E N and r E R~ the v-dimensional cube Br -{6 E R" ~ ~~6~~~ C r} and define Lhc
projection function (3; : R" -r B; which assigns to an element x E R" the element b E B;
minimiaing ~~x - 6~~2i so for every j E 1", ((j;(x))~ - min{max{-r,x~},r}. Clearly Q; is a
continuous function. Now it is possible to give the definition of a property of a subset of a
Euclidean space, weaker than compactness but stronger than closedness, and hence called
semi-compactness.13
Definition 3.1 (Semi-Compactness)
Let a subset S of R~ be given. Then S is semi-compact if for every r E Rt, ~3; (S) is
closed in R~.
Since the continuous image oí a compact set is compact, every compact subset of R~ is
serni-compacl.. IL will be shown that every semi-cornpact set is closed. Suppose ,S C R~ is
semi-con!pact but not c;losed. '1'hen there exists a converging sequence of points in S with
limit s such that s~ S. Let r E R~ be such that r~ ~~s~~~. Then Q;(S) is not closed,
which contradicts the semi-compactness of S. Two examples of semi-compact sets not being
compact are the sets R~ and N~. An example of a closed set not being semi-compact is the
set {s E R2 ~ s2 - arctan(st)}. It is not difbcult to show that for subsets of R the concepts
of semi-compactness and closedness coincide. When verifying the semi-compactness of a
set it is useful to know that if 0 G r G r and ,~3r(S) is closed then Qr(S) is closed. This
follows easily from the property that Q;(~;(S)) - Q;(S) for r G r. If (3r(S) is closed then
it has to be compact, and since the continuous image of a con!pact set is compact and
therefore closed, the set Q;(~3;(S)) is closed for any r G r. The following assumption with
respect to the set Ak is made.
B1. For k E 1~ the set Ak is a non-empty semi-compact subset of R.
The assumptions made with respect to A~, k E I2i are very weak. Since Q?"(R) - B;" n R,
which is an intersection of two closed sets and therefore closed for every r~ 0, the set
R itself satisfies Assumption B1. So the case Ak - R, k E I2, is not excluded. This is
conceptually the most interesting case, since it corresponds to the situation where in a
dernocrat.ic society price regulations are chosen by political candidates, and where there
are no restrictior!s on the set of admissible price regulations.
However, it is also possible to model that a candidate is not capable of setting arbitrarily
chosen lower and upper bounds on the prices, for example because of institutional reasons.
This might be the more realistic case, since according to Cox (1980) regulators are not
capable of enforcing every possible price regulation. This might be modelled by restricting
the set Ak of admissible price regulations to be some non-empty compact subset of R.
Another possibility is that each candidate is only capable of considering a finite number
of possibilitia5, in which ca.ge the set Ak is a finite set. Assumption B1 also admits many
intermediate possibilities for the set Ak, for example cases where candidates are only able
to regulate prices on some markets. An example for n- 2 is given by the semi-compact
set Ak -{(P!,P2,P!,Pz) E R I PZ - Pz - 1}.
According to Krarner (1973) deterministic voting equilibria only exist under extremely
restrictive assumptions in case the policy space is more than one-dimensional, which is
clearly the case in this paper. This is why attention will also be focused on probabilistic14
voting models, where candidates do not necessarily have perfect information about the
voting decision oí consumers. Voting models with some probabilistic aspects were first
rigorously analyzed in Hinich and Ordeshook (1969, 1971), and Hinich, Ledyard and Or-
deshook (1972). For Lhe sake of simplicity in this paper probabilistic voting models without
abstenl,ions will bc considcrcd following the approach of among othcrs, Comanor (1976),
Coughlin and Nitzan (1981b), and Fcldman and Lee (1988). In Wittrnan (1984) the fol-
lowing two argurïrents for the probabi;istic vating model are given. The first argument is
that political candidates do not have perfect information about the preferences and actions
of the voters. 'Ihis is also the point of view taken in Coughlin, Mueller and Murrell (1990)
where in the preferences of the voters there is a bias in favour of or against a political
candidate not perfectly known to the political candidates. The second argument is that
voters do not have perfect information about the positions of the political candidates when
casting their vote.
It will be assumed that candidates have the same subjective expectations about the
voting behaviour of the consumers. This assumption can easily be relaxed, but is made
for notational convenience. For candidate k E I~ and for every consumer i E Im a voting
function ak' : v'(C') x v'(CZ) -~ (0, 1] describes the expectations of candidate k about
the voting behaviour of consumer i. If the candidates have chosen actions c' E C' and
c~ E C~ then ~rk'(v'(c'), "v'(c~)) is the probability candidate k E I2 assigns to the event
that consumer i E Im votes for him. This completes the description of the economy
E-({X', r`,w'};"~) with political system G-({Ak,({rrk'};~1)}k-1).
Deterministic voting without abstentions corresponds to the case where rr''(v'', vZ') - 1
if v'' ~ v2i, a'`(v'',v2') - 2 if v'' - vZ', a''(v'',v~') - 0 if v'' G v~`, and a2'(v'`,v2') -
1- n'`(v'',v''), b'(v'',v~') E v`(C') x v'(C2). As a matter of realism the assumption that
~rk' is non-decreasing in vk' and non-increasing in vk~', k' ~ k, is often made. For this
paper the only assumption needed with respect to the voting functions is the following.
B2. The function rrk' : v'(Cl) x v`(C2) ~[0,1] is continuous, Vi E 1,,,, t1k E !z.
In case both v'(C') and v'(C2) have no accumulation points Assumption B2 does not
exclude any function rrk' and therefore does not exclude deterministic voting behaviour.
'l'his is for cxamplc thc casc if the sets C,' and C.2 are finite.
A prcference relation }' on X' of a consumer i E I,,, satisfying Assumptions A1 and
A3 admits many representations by utility functions. Now consider the case where such a
representation u` (not necessarily continuous) different from u' is chosen. Since the voting
functions depend on the representation chosen, it is a natural question to ask whether the
voting firnctions ir'' and ~r~' associated with u` are continuous if x'` and ~r~' are continuous,
or in other words is Assumption B2 independent of the representation chosen for the
prefcrencc rclation. To show this, let the function h' : u'(X') -~ u'(X') be defined by15
h'(u'(x')) - u`(x`), b'x' E X'. Let ( t')~EN be a sequence in u'(X') converging to a point
I E u`(.~~'). It. is nol difficull. Lo show that iL is pos:cible Lo construcL a sc,quc~ncc~ (.r''),c,N
in .~~' satixf~'ing rï`(.r' )- lr and (x'~),EN ~.c' (ur sonio .r' E.~'' with ir'(.c') - l. 'I'hi~n
limry~h'(t') - limr~~h'(~'(x'.)) - lim.-.~u`(x'r) - u'(x`) - h'(u`(x')) - h'(t), and
therefore the function h' is continuous. Let be given (v'',v2i) E v'(C') x v'(C~), where v'
is the indirect utility function associated with u'. Then irk'(v'',vZ') - nk'(h'(v'`),h`(vZ`))
and hence ~rk' is continuous by the continuity of the functions rrk' and ie'.
The political candidates are assumed to maximize either both their expected plurality
or both their probability of winning the elections. In the first case the pay-off function
K' : C' x C~ ~ R of candidate 1 is defined by
m m
Kt (ct c21 - ~~t; (v;(ct), v'(cs)1 -~ a2` (v'(ct), v'(c2)1 , b'ct E Cr, b'c~ E Cz. (4)
l J ;-t l J ;-r
` J
The pay-off function K~ : C' x C~ -~ R of candidate 2 is easily seen to be equal to -K'.
If candidates maximize their probability of winning the elections then the pay-off function
K' : C' x CZ -~ R of candidate 1 is defined by
K~1 ~c~ c2~ - ~ llxt;
(v;(cr) v;(cs)1 7-r xz; (v;(cr) v;(cz)1
{SCI,,,~IS~~zm}j)~ES l l;Ellml`S l 1
}2 ~ 11
xt; (v;(ct) v;(c2)1 7-r Az; (v;(ct) v;(c2)1
- 2, dc~ E C', dc2 E C2. (5)
{SCI,~IIS~-~m}'ES
l 1;El Im!`S l 1
Here ~S~ denotes the number of elements of a set S. In case of a tie, the toss with a fair coin
determines the outcome of the elections. Empty sets are included in the summation and the
convention is made that jj~EV Ak'(v'(cl), v'(c~)) - 1. The pay-off function K~ : C' x C2 -~ R
of candidate 2 is again easily seen to be equal to -K'. Now price regulations will be
determined endogenously as the outcome of a game with sets of admissible actions C' and
C~ and pay-o(f functions K' and K~.
Definition 3.2 (Political Economic Equilibrium)
A politica! cronomic equilibrium oJthe economy E-({X', ~',w'}m~) with po(itical system
C-({Ak, ({nk'}m1)}k-1) is a Nash equilibrium jor the mixed extension oj the game G-
(C',C2,K',K2), where C' and CZ are as defined in (9), and Kt and K2 are either as
defined in (,{) or as defined in (5).
For k E I2, let D(Ck) be the set of Borel probability measures on Ck. Then, formally, a Nash
equilibrium for the mixed extension of the game CJ defined above is a pair of probability
measures (p'',W'Z) E D(C') x D(C2) such that
I Kt(ct,c~)d(fr~t(c') x WZ(c~)) - m~ f K1(cl,c~)d(l~'(c') x l~2(cZ)),
(c~,c~)EC~xC~ k1ED(C~) (d,c~)ECrxG~16
and
~ li~(c~,c~)d(ti'r(cr) x p'~(c~)) - max ~ li~(cr,c~)d(t~'r(c~) x tc~(c~)),
(c~,c~)E('~xCz a~ED(C~) (c~,c~)EC~xC~
see for example Dasgupta and Maskin ( 1986).
lJsually, thcbrists in voting tbcory are reluctant to use an equilibriurn in mixed strategics
a.4 a solutíon to a game as described in Definition 3.2. 'I'he main objection against mixed
strategies is that the game in Definition 3.2 does not take into account the dynamic features
of carnpaigns in real world elections. During the campaign political candidates have the
possibility to sequentially adjust their proposals. In case an equilibrium in pure strategies
exists a political candidate can use his pure strategy during the entire campaign. In case
political candidates adopt a mixed strategy then the proposals made by them at a specific
point in time will in general not be best responses to each other. Therefore on the next
point in time a candidate might want to adjust his strategy. Aowever, as has been pointed
out in McKelvey and Ordeshook (1976) this criticism is not completely justified and it is
intereating to consider mixed strategy equilibria too, their main reasons being the following.
First if one wants to analyze dynamic issues, then this should be explicitly incorporated in
the game defined. Considering mixed strategy equilibria for the static game of Definition
3.2 is an essential first step. Second, it is possible to give several reasonable dynamic
models where indeed equilibria corresponding to the mixed strategy equilibria of the static
game are obtained. It seems reasonable that even in a dynamic context candidates make
proposals in the support set of mixed strategy equilibria of the static game.
4 Existence Results
The existence of a political economic equilibrium will be shown in this section. The first
step is to show that the set oí admissible actions of each candidate is non-empty. The
following theorem is about the existence of a constrained equilibrium for a given lower and
upper bound on the prices.
Theorem 4.1
Let an economy ï~y,al,satisfying Assumptions A1, A2, A3, and A4 be given. Then there
exists a ronstrnined equilibrium (x'~, ., x'"`, I', L', p') of the economy ï~p,yl.
Proof -
The conditions given in Drèze (1975) are satisfied, where the exiatence of a constrained
equilibrium is shown.
Q.E.D.17
In the following theorem it is shown that there exists a number M E R} such that if
in a constrained equilibrium the price of a commodity is higher than M, then every con-
sumer keeps his initial endowments of this commodity. The number M can be chosen
independently of the price regulations imposed. This is quite remarkable since the follow-
ing intuition behind this result is wrong. If the price of a commodity is very high, then
every consurncr wants to supply this commodity and the only way to obtain an equilib-
rium i~ therefore to ration the excess supplies of this commodity compíetely. This intuition
is not correct, since there might be prices of other commodities being even higher. Thc
right argument goes along the following lines. If the price of a commodity is very high
and a consumer demands this commodity then he also has to demand an amount of the
numeraire commodity which exceeds the total endowments of the nunrerairc comrnodity,
giving a contradiction since this can not happen in equilibrium. It has to be remarked
that it is indeed possible that an equilibrium price is greater than M since the minimum
price of a commodity could be greater than M. In case the assumptions of Theorem 4.2
are not satisfied it is possible that a number M with the desired properties does not exiat.
This follows immediately from the example in Benassy (1975, Section 6). The constrained
equilibria derived in this example satisfy the equilibrium concepts of both Benassy and
Drèze, wt~ile for every price regulation in R on every market some trade occurs in the
corresponding constrained equilibrium.
Theorem 4.2
I,et an cr.onomy F, -({X',r',w'};"r) satisjying Assumptions A1, A2, and A3 be given.
l,et M Ge a.G in Lemma 2.1. 'I'hen, jor every (p, p) E R, fj (x'r, ., x`"`, l`, 1' p`) is n
constmincd equilibrium oj the economy ï~p,pl -({X`,r',w'}m„P~y,pl) and pk ~ M jnr
some k E ln IheA xk' - wk and !k - 0 jor every i E I,,,. -
Proof
Suppose (x'' ,..., x'"`, l', L', p') is a constrained equilibrium of the economy E~p,pl with for
some k E I,,, pk ) M and !k G 0. Moreover, let k be such that for every j E I,,, p~ ) pk
implies l~ - 0. Suppose that lk is binding for every consumer i E Im. Then it holds that
~;-r(xk` - wk) -~;"r lk G 0, a contradiction. Consequently some consumer h E Im is
not rationed on his supply on market k, and so x'h E Oh(l", L', p'), with lk --ivk and
l~ -(~, Vj E I„ `{k}. By Lemma 2.3 there is no loss of generality in assuming that for
every j E I,,, h~ -w~ and L~ G w~. So (l', L', p') E GM and therefore, by Lemma 2.1,
xó ~ wo, a contradiction. Hence pk ~ M for some k E I„ implies !k - 0. Therefore, for
every i E I,,,, xk ~ wk, and since ~;'-1 xk' -~;-r wk it holds that xk' - wk.
Q.E.D.18
Lemma 4.3 shows that there is a compact subset of R such that for every element of R
outside this compact set, the set of corresponding constrained equilibrium allocations is
the same as Lhe seL of constraine,d equilibrium allocations corresponding with sorne clement.
of H in this cornpact. set. This is not surprising since, by Thmrem 4.2 we know that if the
constrained cyuilibrium price on some market is greater than or equal to M then no tradc
t.akcs plxcc on this markct.
Lemma 4.3
Get an economy Elp,yl -({X', ~', w'}mr, Pln,Pl) satisfying Assumptions A1, A2, A3, and
A4 be given. Let M be as in Lemma 2.1 for the economy E-({X',~',w`}ml). For
every j E I,,, let p~ - min{M,p~} and p~ - min{M,p~}. Then (xs1, .. , x'"`, I', L', p`)
is a constrained equilibrium of the economy E~p,yl for some p' E Plp,pl if and only if
(x'', , x"m l' L', p') is a constrained equilíbrium ojthe economy E~P,PI - ({X`, r',w'};" r, PtP,pl),
for some p`' E Plp.pl. -
Proof
Using Lemma 2.3 there is no loss of generality in assuming that for every j E I,,, l~ 1-w~
and L~ G w~.
Let (x"~, ., x`"`,1', C,p') be a constrained equilibrium of the economy Ety,P~ for some
p" E Ptn,pt. Let p` E Plp,pl be defined by p~ - min{M,p~}, Elj E I,,, pó - 1. Clearly
Conditions 2 and 3 of Definition 2.2 are satisfied for (x'r, ... , x'n`,1', L', p'). If p~ G p~
then p~ G p~ and if pj 7 p~ then p~ ~ p~, and therefore Condition 4 of Definition 2.2 is
satisfied. Define J-{j E I„ ~ P~ - M}. For every j E J it holds that p~ J M and hence
by Theorem 4.2 for every i E Im, 0- l~ - x~' - w~, so x" E i'(1`, L', p'). It remains to
be shown that for every i E Im, x" E 6`(l', L", p"). Suppose for some h E Im there exists
yh E bh(1`, I,', p`') such that y~ rti x"h Then, using the convexity of preferences, there
cxists yh E Oh(l', L', p') such that yh ~h x'h. ClearlY yti ~ I'h(l', L',P'), So P''yh ~ P"'yh
and using that p~ - p~, bj E In `J, p~ ? p~, bj E J, and lj - 0, bj E J, it has to hold
that yk ~ wk for some k E J. Define p(a) - ap" -}- (1 - a)p'. Define a' - sup{a E[0, 1] ~
xh E t1h(l',G',p(a)) implies x~ - w~, tlj E J}. So there exists a sequence (~r)rEN such
that ar -~ a`, 0 G~r G a', and x`h E Oh(l", L', P(a')). Hence x"h E ~h(l', L', P(~`))
using the upper semi-continuity of 0" (since po(a') - 1, see Drèze (1975)) at the point
(l', L', p(a")). As a consequence of the existence of yh, a' C 1. Now let (ar)rEp7 be a se-
quence such that a' -~ a' and ar ~~'. Then there exists yhT E Oh(1', L', p(~r)) such
that for sornc kr E J, ~k: 1 wk,. Hence ytir E L1h(C`,L',p(ar)) where lk: --wkr and
l~~ - l~, tlj E 1„ `{kr}. Without loss of generality (gnr l'~)rEN -~ (yh,l"), where for some
k E J, !k --wk and l~ - l~, bj E I„ `{k}. Moreover, yh E ~ti(l', L",p(a`)) using the
upper scmi-continuity of 0~ at the point (1', L', p(a')). Since yn~ E Oh(I', G', p(~r)) it
follows t.hat yh E Oh(!', G',P(a`)). So x'h ~h y" and therefore x'h E Oh(C, L',P(a")).19
Since (!', I,', p(a')) E G,~.r, xoh 1 v~o, a contradiction since ~;" 1 xo' - wo. So indeed
x" E b'(l', I,`, p) for every i E!m.
Let (x'', ., x'm, l', L', p') be a constrained equilibrium of the economy ~~p,yl for some
p E P~p,pl. Define the sets J',J2, and J3 by
J~ - {jEl„~p~-Mand3iEl,,,,x~`-w~-L~},
J~ -{J E I„ I P~ -!yl and yi E i,,,, l~ ~ x~` - w~ ~ L~ },
J3
- {J EI„~P~ -Mand~iElm, l~-x~`-w~}.
Let p' E P~~,pl be defined by p~ - p~, `dj E J~ U J2, p~ - p~, t1j E J3, and p~ - p~, b'j E
In `(J' U J2 U J'). It is casily verificd that (x'~, ..., x'm, l', L', p') satisfies Conditions
2, 3, and 4 of llefinition 2.2. For j E I,,, if p~ C M then p~ - p~, and if p~ - M
then p~ 1 p~ and by Theorem 4.2, 0- 1~ - x~' - w~, Vi E Im. Consequently, for every
i E I,,,, x" E ry'(l', L', p') C ry'(!', L',p'), and hence x" E 6'(1', L', p'). So Condition 1 of
Definition 2.2 is satisfied.
Q.E.D.
For a given economy E let M be as in Lemma 2.1 and for k E la define AM -,Q,2y"(Ak), and
define C,~ as in (3) where Ak is replaced by AM. The following lemma states that under
the assumptions made the set of actions CM is non-empty and compact for k E Iz.
Lemma 4.4
Let be given E-({X',~',w'};"1) and ({A~}k-1) satisfying the Assumptions A1, A2, A3,
and f31. I,et M be as in I,emma 2.1. Then the set C,ky, k E IZ, is non-empty and compact.
Proof
For k E h it follows immediately from Theorem 4.1, Theorem 2.5, and the set A,ky being
non-empty according to Assumption B1, that the set C,ky is non-empty. Clearly the set
CM ís bounded. The set CM is closed if every convergent sequence in CM has a limit in
C,~y~. Let (p' pr q'),EN be a convergent sequence in C,Ar with limit (p, p, q). By definition
of C,M there exists a sequence (xr,pr, py q'),.Ep, such that (x' l(qr), L(q') p(p', pY, q')) is a
constrained equilibrium of the economy l'lp~,~-~ -({X`,r',w'}m„Ply.,p 1). This sequence
is obviously bounded and therefore has a convergent subsequence (x'~, p'~ p' q'~)~Ep with
limit, say, (x, p, p, q). Since the sets X 1 , ..., X m, Q, and A,ky are closed (by Assumption
B1), it holds that Vi E Im, x` E X`, q E Q, and (~,p) E A,ky. It will be shown that
(x, l(q), !,(q), p(p, p, q)) satisfies the four conditions of a constrained equilibrium of the
economy E~P,p~ -({X',Y-',w'};"1,P~P,pI). Clearly, for j E l,,,
Pi(PTj~P'e,q{~) - max{p~~,min{P~~,P~~(2 - 3q~~) tp~~(3q}~ - 1)}}20
-r max {p~ , min {p„p~( 2- 3q~ ) t p~(3q~ - 1)}}- p~ (p, p, q),
l~(q'~) - -min{1,3q~~}w~ -. -min{1,3q~}w~ - 1~(q),




Using thc results in Drèze (1975) it follows that for every i E I,,,, b' is an upper semi-
continuous correspondence from -Rt x R} x{1} x Rt into X'. Using (6), (7), and
(M), this yields x' E b`(1(q), L(q), p(p, p,q)}. Consequently, Condition 1 is satisfied. Con-
dition 2 holds since ~mr x' -~mr lim,y~ x'~~ - lim,-,~ ~;"r x`r~ - w. Obviously
0 C x'~ C tii„ t1i E I,,,, Vj E In. This property will be used in order to prove that
Conditions 3 and 4 are satisfied. Suppose there exists a consumer i E Im and a commodity
j E I„ such t.hat x~ -w~ - L~ (q) . Then q~ ~ 3 and so l~ (q) --w~. Hence for all consumers
h E Im it holds that x~ - w~ 1-w~ 1-w~ - l~ (q) . Suppose now there exists a consumer
i E Im and a commodity j E I„ such that x'~ - w~ - 1~ (q) . Then q~ G 3 and so L~ (q) - iv~.
Hence for all consumers h E Im it holds that x~ - w~ C w~ - w~ G fvl - L~ (q) , which
shows that Condition 3 is satisfied.
Suppose there P,xlst9 a commodity j E I„ such that p~(p,p,q) G p~. Then q~ C 3 and
consequently G~ (q) - w~ ~ w~ - w~ ~ x'~ - w~, bci E I,,,. Finally, suppose there ex-
ists a commodity j E I„ such that p~(~, p, q) ~ p~. Then q~ ~ ~ and consequently
h(q) --ili~ c-w~ C x`~ - w~, di E I,,,, which proves that Condition 4 is satisfied.
So, (x, l(q), L(q), p(p, p, q)) satisfies all conditions of Definition 2.2 for a constrained equi-
librium of the economy ïtp,Pl. Since (p, p) E AM it holds that (p, p, q) is an element of
CM.
Q.E.D.
For k E IZ define the function K,ky : C~y x CM -r R as in (4) or (5). For every i E 1,,, it fol-
luws from Lemma 4.3 that v'(Ck) - v'(CM), so the function ~rk' : v'(Cr) x v'(CZ) ~[0, 1~ is
well defined on v'(C~y) x v'(C,Zy) and therefore the functiou KM is well defined on C,'y x CM.
In the next lemma it is shown that the function KM is continuous.
Lemma 4.5
Let be given E- ({X',~',w'}mr) and G- ({Ak,({ak'};-r)}k-1) satisfying the Assump-
tions A1, A2, A~?, Bl, and 82. Let M be as in Gemma 2.1. Then for k E IZ the function
KM : C,ry x CM -~ R as defined in (.j) or (5~ is continuous.
Proof
It is first shown that the function v' is continuous on C, bci E 1,,,. Let be given a sequence
(pr P' qr)rEN in the sct C converging to an element (~, p, q). Let x'~ E b'(1(qr), 1(yr), p(pr, pr qr ))
then, similar to the proof of Lemma 4.4, without loss of generality the sequence (x'~)rEN
converges to an element x' and x' E b'(l(q),L(q),p(~,p,q)). Hence, uaing the continuity21
of u', v'(p' pr q') - u'(x'~) -~ u'(x') - v'(p,p,q). By Lemma 4.3 for every i E Im and
k E Iz it holds t.hat. n'(Ck) - n'(CM) and therefore by Assumption B2 Lhc function nk' is
continuuus un n'(Cti~) x n'(C,y). Now thc continuity of KM follows fronr thc continuity of
ri' and rrA`, b'i E 1,,,.
Q.E.D.
In the next theorem the existence of a political economic equilibrium is shown.
Theorem 4.8
l,et be given h; -({X',}',w`};"t) and G- ({Ak,({trk'};"t)}k-1) satisfying the Assump-
tions Al, A2, A~3, Bl, and B2. Then there exists a political economic equilibrium for the
economy F, wilh political system G.
Proof
In order Lo show the existence of a political econotnic equilibrium, the existence of a Nash
equilibrium of the mixed extension of the game G-(C',Cz, K', Kz) has to be shown.
Let M be as in Lemma 2.1 and consider the game C~y -(C~y, CM, K~y, K,zy) . According
to Lemma 4.4 the sets C~y and CM are non-empty and compact. By Lemma 4.5 K~y and
ICM are continuous functions on C,'~r x CM. Ilence using a theorem of Glicksberg (1952)
the mixed extcnsion of CJ~y has at least one Nash equilibrium outcome. Obviously, using
Lemma 4.3, this Nash equilibrium outcome yields a Nash equilibrium outcome for the game
Q.E.D.
[t is interest,ing to have suf8cient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies. Usually it is sufficient to assume certain concavity and convexity conditions with
respect to the pay-off functions and strategy sets in order to prove the existence of a pure
atratcgy Na,.h cquilihrium, scr for cxarnplc Fcldrnan and Lcx: (1988). liowcvcr, sincc thc set
Ck is not ncccssarily convex these conditions rnight not be satisfied. In '1'heorem 4.7 othcr
suf6cient conditions for the existence of a pure strategy political economic equilibriurn are
given. [t is clear that these conditions are very strong, since the following separability
assumption is needed.
B3. For every i E Im there exists a function f' : v'(Ct) -~ R and a function g' : v'(Cz) -~
R such that 7r'`(vt',vzi) - f
;(vt;) -g;(vz;) } ~ y(vt; vz;) E v'(Cl) x v'(Cz).
Clearly, for all i E h,,, az,(vr; vz;) - 1- at;(vt; vz;) -~ } g;(vz;) - f;(vt;) y(vt; vz;) E
v'(C' ) x v`(Cz) and hence rrzi also satisfies the separability assumption. It is not difficult to
show that the continuity of xt` implies that f' and g' must be continuous for every i E Im.22
Since the voting functions depend on the utility representation chosen for the preference
relation of a consumer, ít is important to show that Assumption B3 holds independent oí
this representation. Let u' be a representation of ~' of consumer i E Im different frorn
u' and define the function h' : u'(X') -~ u`(X`) in the same way as has been done below
Assumption B2. Denote the indirect utility functions and the voting functions correspond-
ing with i i` by v', ir'', and ira', respectively, for every i E I,,,. Let be given (v'`, va') E
~ z i;. t; z; ,: ,~ ~: i,'(C } x v'(C ). 1'ben fr tv ,v- )- R-(h'(v- ), h`(v--)) - f`(h'(v'-`)) - g~(h~(v'`-)) -~ 2, so
n'' satis(ies Assumption B3.
Theorem 4.7
Let be given E-({X`,~',w`};-1) and G- ({Ak,({fik'}ml)}k-~) satisfying the Assump-
tions A1, A.~, A3, Bl, B2, and 63. Then thene exists a pune strategy political economic
equilibrium of the economy E with políticaJ system G in case for k E Ia the function Kk is
defined as irz (.jJ.
Proof
Let c"' E C' be such that ~m f'(v'(c'')) - max ~ 3 f'(v`(cl)), and let c'a E Ca i-t c EC ~i-1
be such that ~m ~ q'(v`(c'a)) - max~~E~s ~m1 g'(v'(c2)). Then c'' and c`a are well defined
using Lemma 4.3, Assumption B1, and the continuity for every i E Im of the functions
f', g', and v'. Moreover,
m m





~ 2~ f'(v'(cl)) - 2~9'(v'(c"a)), dc~ E C',
:-i ~-i
m
2 ~ 9(v'(c~a)) - 2 ~ f'(v'(~'))
~-i ;-i
m
2~9'(v'(ca)) -2~Í'(v'(~')), dca E Ca.
Hence ( c'',c"a) is a pure strategy political economic equilibrium of the economy E with
political system G.
Q.E.D.
Although Assumption B3 is very restrictive, it is of some interest since the voting model
given in Coughlin, Mueller and Murrell ( 1990) satisfies this assumption. Let (cl,ca) E
C' x Ca be given. In the model of Coughlin, Mueller and Murrell (1990), a consumer
i E ~m votes for candidate 1 if v' (c~) - v' (ca) 1 b', does not vote if i,' (c') - v' (ca) - b',
and votes for candidate 2 if v' (c' )- v' (ca) G 6', where the information of the candidates is
that b' is a random variable being uniformly distributed in some given interval [-r', r'] C R.23
IL is assumr,d Lhat w' (c~ )- n' (c~) ~ G r', V(c~, c1) E C' x C~. "I'his irnplies for cvi,ry z E 1,,,,
~~`(c~,c~) -
~ t
2T'(77'(f') - V'(~1)), d(r',71) E~,' x~rt,
2-~
2r~(v'(c~) - v'(c')), t~(c',c2) E C' x C,~,
so in this c.ase the choice J'(v'') - !v'', b'v'` E v`(C'), and g'(v2') - ' v2', 'dv~' E v'(C2) s.~ s.~ ,
satisfies Assumption B3.
5 An Example
In this section an example of the model of the previous sections will be exanvned. The
example makes clear that by the imposition of price regulations it is possible to obtain
politically more desired allocations than the Walrasian equilibrium allocation. First the
set of constrained equilibrium allocations in an economy will be considered given some
price regulation. Consider an economy with two consumers, two commodities, and Cobb-
Douglas utility functions. Commodity 0 is a numeraire commodity with price equal to
one. 1'he consumers have the following characteristics, X' - X2 - R~, u' (xo,xl) -
(xo)' (~~)5, `dx E X', u~(~o,~7) -(xo)'(xr)', Hx E X~, w' - w2 -(4,1). Let be
given some (p, p) E R such that 0 G p- p- p. It is again useful Lo work with pseudo-
prices. 1'he rationing scheme will be a function of the pseudo-price q, where q is an element
of the set Q-(0,1]. The functions 1 and L are given by
l(q) - -min{1,2q}ti7r--2min{1,2q},l~qEQ,
L(q) - min {1,2 - 2q} p- p min {1,2 - 2q} , `dq E Q.
Notice that the functions l and L are slightly different from the ones used before. In case of
a fixed price the functions given above are easier to work with. After some computations
it follows that
(~ 4~), 5 ' 5p
b~(1(q), L(q),(l,p)) - (169 - 12, rs p f 1),
(4pq ~ 4,1 - 4q),
and
(4~18 ~) s ~ sp ~
ó~(l(q), L(q),(1,P)) - (169 - 12,' p f 1),
(4pq f 4,1 - 4q),
0 G p, max{0, 20p } c q c min{1, ~},
OGpC 16, ~ GqG 1,
16Cp, OGqG z~,
0 G p, max{0,~} G q G min{1,~},
OGpCI, ~GqGI,
1Cp,OCqG~.24
l3y solving ~,z-~ 6'(l(q), L(q), (1, p)) - ru all pseudo-prices corresponding with a constrained
cquilibriurn for thc~ cv~onomy Ety,yt are obtained. Let thc set of admissiblc~ pria~ rcgulations
for both political candidates be some non-empty subset A of R such that 0 G a~ - az, b~a E
A. It, follows that thc set C of admissible actions corresponding with the set of admissibl~




orp-4and 3 CqC 17, or4GpC 1óandq- 16-p, otp~ 1óandq-0}.(9)
20 - - 20 20p
Although there is an interval of equilibrium pseudo-prices in the case where p- 4, they all
correspond to the same constrained equilibrium allocation, which is the unique Walrasian
equilibrium allocation. Therefore, considering the remarks made at Theorem 2.4, the
possibility of not specifying price regulations is not excluded. Moreover, there is no loss
of generality in considering only the admissible action corresponding with q- 2 in this
case. It can be verified that in case 0 C p c 1 or p~ 16 every consumer keeps his initial
endowments in a constrained equilibrium corresponding with these values of p. If the price
regulation is this extreme, no trade takes pla~ce. Using the functions u` and á' it is easy to
derive the indirect utility function of consumer i E IZ, v` : C~ R. The voting functions
of both consumers are assumed to be the same as in Coughlin and Nitzan (1981a), i.e.,
Vi E 12i b'k E I~,
,~k,
~.t; (vr; vx;l - e dv'', v~' E v'(C). l ~ I e,,,: } e„s. ,
Suppose candidates attempt to maximize their expected plurality. It is easy to show that
for every (c~,c2) E C x C it holds that
x [s ~`
~~r;(v~(Cr),v`(C2)) -(~7f~~(v~(C~),v~(C2)) ~ 0 t~ e~'t`'lev't``1 i ev,~`'le~'~`'1.
;-t i-t
Now suppose candidates attempt to maximize their probability of winning the elections.
Then it is easy to show that
nrr(vr(c~),vr(c~))xrs(v~(cr),v~(c~)) f 2rrrr(vr(cr),vr(c~))~zs(v~(cr),v~(c~))
f2~~~(v~(cr),v2(c~))nzi(T'r(cr),vr(c~)) - 2? 0 q e~cl`~le~~l`~1 1 ev~t`'lev'1`'1.
Using the symmetry of the game, it is then easily seen that both in the case where political
candidates rnaximize expected plurality and in the case where political candidates max-
imize their probability of winning the elections, in a political economic equilibrium both
candidates choose an action c' E C that maximizes ~?-r v' (c) over c E C. Consider the case.








b~(~(q)~L(q)~(1rP)) (25r1 5) (16~15) (15~126)
óz(~(q)~~(q)~(1~P)) (5s~~s) (ss~s) (fis~ás)
~(q) ~2 -2 -ti
2s
L(q) d is 2 a s
v~(p,p,q) 1.677 1.6 1.506
vz(p,p,q) 3.407 3.676 3.833
z
~~-, v'(p,p,q) 5.084 5.278 5.339
Table I: Conetrained equilibria.
The constrained equilibria are summarized in Tab1e I. From Table I it follows immediately
that in the political economic equilibrium both candidates choose for a price regulation
where p- 5. Compared with the Walrasian equilibrium allocation, this is advantageous
for consumer 2 and disadvantageous for consumer 1. It should be remarked that the action
where p - 5 and no maximum price is specified is equivalent in this case. Consumer 2 is
rationed on his excess supply of commodity 1.
Now consider the case where Ar - A2 - R. Using the definition of a constrained
equilibrium and the remarks made below (9) it is not difficult to show that the set of
admissible actions C corresponding with the set of admissible price regulations {(p, p) E R ~
1 G p- p G 16} gives each candidate the same strategic possibilities as the set of admissible
actions corresponding with the set R. In a political economic equilibrium both candidates
therefote choose an action c' such that c' - arg max~EC ~?r v' (c) . Clearly c' ~(4, 4, 2).
So in the case where every price regulation is allowed, a price regulation is chosen where
the Walrasian eyuilibrium price system and the Walrasian equilibrium allocation is not
allowed. It can be shown that c" -(5.035, 5.035, 0.1089). The corresponding constrained
equilibrium will therefore be characterized by rationing on the supply of commodity 1.
Grandmont ( 1982) explains the occurrence of temporary price rigidities and quantity
rationing by making the observation that in the short run quantities move faster than
prices. The example considered in this section demonstrates that price rigidities may exist
in the long run too.26
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